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• Iceland, Ireland and Latvia experienced similar developments before the crisis, such as sharp 
increases in banks’ balance sheets and the expansion of the construction sector. However the 
impact of the crisis was different: Latvia was hit harder than any other country in the world. 
Ireland also suffered heavily, while Iceland came out from the crisis with the smallest fall in 
employment, despite the greatest shock to the financial system. 
• There were marked differences in policy mix: currency collapse in Iceland but not in Latvia, 
letting banks fail in Iceland but not in Ireland, and the introduction of strict capital controls 
only in Iceland. The speed of fiscal consolidation was fastest in Latvia and slowest in Ireland. 
• Economic recovery has started in all three countries and there are several encouraging 
signals. The programme targets in terms of fiscal adjustment, structural reforms and financial 
reform are on track in all three countries. 
• Iceland seems to have the right policy mix.  
• Internal devaluation in Ireland and Latvia through wage cuts did not work, because private-
sector wages hardly changed. The productivity increase was significant in Ireland and 
moderate in Latvia, yet was the result of a greater fall in employment than the fall in output, 
with harmful social consequences. 
• The experience with the collapse of the gigantic Icelandic banking system suggests that 
letting banks fail when they had a faulty business model is the right choice. 
• There is a strong case for a European banking federation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Three small, open European economies —Iceland, Ireland and Latvia with populations of 0.3, 4.4 
and 2.3 million respectively—got into serious trouble during the global financial crisis. Behind their 
problems were rapid credit growth and expansion of other banking activities in the years leading up 
to the crisis (Table 1), largely financed by international borrowing. This led to sharp increases in 
gross (Iceland and Ireland) and net (Iceland and Latvia) foreign liabilities (Tables 2 and 3)1. Credit 
booms fuelled property-price booms and a rapid increase in the contribution of the construction 
sector to output – above 10 percent in all three countries. While savings-investment imbalances in 
the years of high growth were largely of private origin, public spending kept up with the revenue 
over-performance that was the consequence of buoyant economic activity. During the crisis, property 
prices collapsed, construction activity contracted and public revenues fell, especially those related to 
the previously booming sectors. All three countries had to turn to the International Monetary Fund 
and their European partners for help. 
 
There were also common elements to crisis management in the three countries. Fiscal austerity 
programmes, structural reforms, the fostering of private debt restructuring and strengthening of the 
banking system were central to their economic adjustment programmes.  
 
However, partly due to differences in institutional set up, there were marked differences in policy 
responses, in terms of, for example, exchange rate policy, the adoption of capital controls and the 
handling of the banking crisis. There were also marked differences in economic outcomes.  
 
The purpose of this Policy Contribution is to compare the policy responses in, and the adjustments 
made by, the three countries. Based on this comparison, we draw lessons for exchange rate policy, 
internal devaluation, capital controls, banking sector restructuring and fiscal consolidation. By 
selecting similar countries that responded differently, this paper conducts a kind of controlled 
experiment, even though we cannot always isolate the impacts of individual elements of the policy 
mix. 
 
The next section discusses the key differences in policy responses, followed by an assessment of 
economic outcomes. The final section concludes and compares the results with other perspectives 
expressed in the literature. 
 
                                                 
1  Note that the sharp deterioration of Icelandic net international investment position after the crisis (Table 2) is 
largely related to defaulted banks. Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Gylfi Zoega (2011) conclude that without banks, the 
international investment position of Iceland has improved. Table 3 shows that three-quarters of gross external debt is the 
liability of defaulted banks. According to Lane (2011b), the significant deterioration of Irish net external liabilities during 
the past three years is most likely related to the internationally-leveraged structure of the financial portfolios of domestic 
Irish residents. 
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Table 1: Assets of the banking system (% GDP) 
 2000 2004 2007 2010 
 Credit to the private sector 
Iceland 97 165 349 n.a. 
Ireland 105 134 200 213 
Latvia 19 51 89 104 
 Total assets 
Iceland (with inter-inst.) 385 542 1035 n.a. 
Iceland (w.o. inter-inst.) 236 285 426 n.a. 
Ireland (total) n.a. 484 706 759 
Ireland (w.o. international 
banks) 
n.a. 230 367 476 
Latvia n.a. 106 145 169 
Source: Credit to the private sector is from the IMF IFS; total assets are from Central Bank of Iceland, Central Bank of 
Ireland and Central Bank of Latvia. 
Note: Ireland’s figures for total assets include the Irish operations of international banks. The Central Bank of Iceland 
reports assets both with and without inter-institutional transactions. Total liabilities reported are equal total assets without 
inter-institutional transactions. The increase in the credit/GDP ratio from 2007 to 2010 in Ireland and Latvia is primarily 
due to the fall in GDP. 
 
Table 2: International investment position (% GDP) 
    2000 2004 2007 2010 
Iceland foreign assets 45 125 514 266 
 foreign liabilities 112 192 625 895 
  net foreign assets -67 -66 -112 -629 
Ireland foreign assets 643 857 1,195 1,691 
 foreign liabilities 650 875 1,215 1,782 
  net foreign assets -8 -18 -19 -91 
Latvia foreign assets 50 65 81 117 
 foreign liabilities 80 118 155 197 
  net foreign assets -30 -52 -75 -80 
Source: central banks of the three countries (foreign assets and liabilities) and Eurostat (GDP at current prices). 
Note: see Table 3 below and Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Gylfi Zoega (2011) for the interpretation of Icelandic net 
foreign assets position change during the past three years, and Lane (2011b) for an assessment of the Irish case. 
 
Table 3: Gross external debt of Iceland (% GDP) 
 2000Q4 2004Q4 2007Q4 2008Q3 2008Q4 2011Q2 
Monetary authorities 2 0 0 6 20 18 
General government 24 23 19 42 36 33 
Deposit money banks (DMBs) 51 131 455 685 46 11 
Other sectors 27 19 46 61 806 751 
DMBs undergoing winding-up 
proceedings ... ... ... ... 739 696 
     Others 27 19 46 61 67 55 
Direct investment 1 6 48 72 90 93 
Total external debt 107 179 568 866 998 906 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland (external debt) and Eurostat (GDP at current prices). 
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2. Differences in institutional set up and policy response 
 
2.1 Exchange rate regime and developments 
There was a broad consensus at the outbreak of the crisis that real exchange rates in all three 
countries should be depreciated to help economic recovery – which has indeed happened during the 
past three years, but through different means and to different degrees.   
 
The differences are partly related to exchange rate regimes and partly to policy choices. Ireland has 
been a member of the euro area since 1999, and therefore adjustment through the nominal exchange 
rate against the euro was not an option. Latvia has had a fixed exchange rate with the euro since 
2004, and Latvian policymakers chose not to exercise the option to devalue2. Both Ireland and Latvia 
decided to embark on a so called ‘internal devaluation’, ie efforts to cut wages and prices. Iceland 
has a floating exchange rate. When markets started to panic and withdrew external lending, given the 
size of the country’s obligations (Table 2), there was no choice but to let the currency depreciate. 
The Icelandic krona depreciated by about 50 percent in nominal terms – depreciation would have 
been sharper without capital controls (see section 2.3 below). 
 
Nevertheless the unit labour-cost (ULC) based real effective exchange rate (REER) has depreciated 
in all three countries. The ULC-REER can be decomposed as: 
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where reer(ulc) is the labour-cost based real effective exchange rate, neer is the nominal effective 
exchange rate (an increase indicates appreciation), ulc is the domestic unit labour cost, ulc(foreign) is 
the foreign unit labour cost, empl is the number of people employed, hours is the average hours 
worked per employee, wage is the nominal hourly wage (or more precisely: hourly labour cost, 
which is also effected by, eg changes in social security contributions paid by the employer), 
production is real output (GDP), and productivity is production divided by labour input, which is the 
product of number of people employed and their average hours worked.  
 
Table 4 presents this decomposition for the changes in the real exchange rate from the real exchange 
rate peak to 2011Q3. It should be noted that the adjustment may continue in the future and therefore 
the table reports the developments during the past three years. For example, as Figure 1 indicates, 
ULC-based REER is still clearly moving downwards in Ireland, is moving somewhat upwards in 
Iceland, and has flattened out in Latvia.  
 
In Iceland the main driving force of real depreciation was the significant fall in the nominal exchange 
rate (45 percent in the period shown in Table 4). Productivity and trading partners’ ULC have hardly 
changed. While the depreciation-induced wage inflation3 (24 percent) eroded some of gain from the 
                                                 
2  Even though Ireland has the euro and the Latvian lats is fixed to the euro, the nominal effective exchange rates 
of these two countries do change somewhat when the exchange rate of the euro against other currencies changes, because 
some of the trade of these countries go outside the euro area. But these changes are largely exogenous, because 
asymmetric shocks in Ireland and Latvia have limited, if any, impact on the euro’s exchange rates. Note that Latvia had a 
peg against the SDR (IMF Special Drawing Rights) until 2004 and in this period the nominal effective exchange rate was 
more variable, as indicated by Figure 1. 
3  Most likely in all three countries there was a change in skill composition of employed labour during the crisis: 
probably more unskilled jobs were lost than skilled jobs. If this is the case, the average wage tends to increase due to this 
compositional change. 
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fall of the nominal exchange rate, the krona is still weaker by 31 percent relative to its pre-crisis level 
in real effective terms. It is also much weaker than it was in 2001, when Iceland had its previous 
currency crisis (see the top-left panel of Figure 1). 
 
By contrast, in Ireland and Latvia the nominal effective exchange rate has hardly changed and real 
depreciation had different drivers.  
 
In Ireland the main reason was productivity improvement (by 12 percent from 2008Q2 to 2011Q3), 
which is almost equal the real depreciation (13 percent). During the last three years, hourly wages 
did not change much, though there was a modest 4 percent wage decline from the peak in wages in 
2009Q2 to the trough in 2011Q1 (see the second panel in the fourth row of Figure 1)4. The 13 
percent real depreciation has restored the real effective exchange rate level of late 2004. 
 
However, it should be also highlighted that the Irish tradable sector was competitive even before the 
crisis and ULC increases characterised mostly the non-tradable sector (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir, 2011; Darvas, Gouardo, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2011). For example, manufacturing ULC was 
on a continuous downward trend (similarly to Germany) in the decade prior to the crisis and has 
declined even further during the crisis. 
 
In Latvia, the main driver of adjustment was a fall in nominal hourly wages (10 percent). The real 
exchange rate adjustment was helped by an increase in foreign ULC (5 percent) and a moderate 
productivity improvement (6 percent). As a result, the Latvian ULC-based REER is 19 percent lower 
in 2011Q3 compared to its peak in 2008Q2, but this adjustment has only restored the early 2007 
value of this index and is still 30 percent higher than in 2000Q15. 
 
However, the public and private sector distinction is crucial for Latvia. Table 5 shows, using annual 
data, that from 2008 to 2010 hourly labour costs declined by 7 percent for the whole economy. But 
this decline primarily came from the public sector: the decline was 26 percent in public 
administration, 22 percent in education and 16 percent in health and social work. In contrast, hourly 
labour costs have declined by only two percent in manufacturing and the decline (if any) in various 
private sector activities was also minor. Furthermore, the recent minor declines in hourly labour costs 
in private sector activities have not even compensated for one year of increase before: the change in 
hourly labour costs from 2007 to 2010 (second data column in Table 5) is in the range of 10-20 
percent for most private sector activities. Therefore, while the public sector in Latvia was able to 
significantly reduce nominal wages, the internal devaluation, ie nominal wage and price falls, hardly 
worked in the private sector. However, due to a greater fall in labour input than output (Tables 7 and 
8), productivity has improved in both industry and manufacturing. According to calculations by the 
Bank of Latvia, the manufacturing ULC-based REER in 2011Q2 was 2 percent below the level of 
2000Q1, yet above the level of 2002.  
 
 
                                                 
4  From 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, average hourly labour costs fell by 5.1 percent in the public sector and 3.1 percent in 
the private sector. Additionally, in public sector a 7.5 percent pension levy was imposed in 2010. 
5  It should be noted that we use the REER published by Eurostat, which is calculated against 36 trading partners, 
not including Russia. Russia’s share in Latvia’s export was 13 percent in 2007 (Russia’s share is much lower for Iceland, 
1.4 percent, and Ireland, 0.4 percent). According to calculations by the Bank of Latvia, the REER that includes Russia as 
well among trading partners depreciated somewhat more than the Eurostat indicator. 
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Table 4: Decomposition of the change in the unit labour cost based real effective exchange rate 
index (from peak* to 2011Q3) 
  
Iceland 
(2007Q4 
= 100) 
Ireland 
(2008Q2 
= 100) 
Latvia 
(2008Q2 
= 100) 
(1)=(2)*(4)/(3) REER ULC 69 87 81 
(2)    NEER 55 98 99 
(3)    Trading partners' ULC 97 101 105 
(4)=(5)/(9)    ULC 120 89 86 
(5)=(6)*(7)*(8)        Total labour cost 111 82 73 
(6)            Employment 94 86 84 
(7)            Hours worked per employee 95 96 96 
(8)            Hourly wages 124 100 90 
(9)        GDP (real) 93 92 85 
Memorandum items    
(10)=(9)/((6)*(7)) Productivity 103 112 106 
(11) Consumer prices 136 98 108 
(12)=(8)/(11) Real wages 91 102 84 
(13) Trading partners' consumer prices 110 106 107 
(14)=(2)*(11)/(13) REER CPI 68 91 100 
Notes. * The peak in Icelandic ULC-based REER was in 2007Q2 (see Figure 1), but it has hardly changed till 2007Q4 
and most adjustment occurred after 2007Q4. Therefore, the table tracks the adjustments since then. In order to get rid of 
very short term noise in the data, the entries shown in the table were calculated in the basis of Hodrick-Prescott filtered 
series with smoothing parameter 1, a very low parameter. Note that the standard smoothing parameter for quarterly data 
is 1600. Figure 1 shows both the original and this Hodrick-Prescott filtered series, which suggests that the filter well 
captures the main tendencies and also the turning points. 
Source: Author’s calculation using data detailed in the note to Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Real effective exchange rate indices and their main components, 2000Q1-2011Q3 
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from Eurostat and the central statistical offices of the three countries. 
Note: For Ireland and Latvia we use the Eurostat indicator for real and nominal effective exchange rate, which is 
calculated against 36 trading partners. REER- ULC from Eurostat is available only up to 2010Q4. Values for 2011Q1-Q3 
are our estimates. For Iceland we use the real effective exchange rate published by the Central Bank of Iceland but the 
nominal effective exchange rate (NEER) is not available from official sources. Therefore, we used the NEER calculated 
by Darvas (2011), which may not be consistent with the REER of the Central Bank of Iceland. However, the bias from 
this inconsistency could be quite small, since trading partners ULC –line (3) of Table 4– looks reasonable and it was 
derived from the REER, NEER and domestic ULC. For each variable two lines are shown: the seasonally adjusted data 
(we used Census X12 for seasonal adjustment) is indicated with a thin line with symbols, and the Hodrick-Prescott 
 8 
filtered values are shown with the same colour thick line without symbols. For Hodrick-Prescott filtering we used the 
smoothing parameter 1, a very low parameter, to filter out high frequency noise only. Note that the standard smoothing 
parameter for quarterly data is 1600. The comparison of the original and this Hodrick-Prescott filtered series suggests 
that the filter well captures the main tendencies and also the turning points. 
 
 
 
Table 5: Latvia: percent change in hourly labour costs by kind of activity 
  
change 
from 2008 
to 2010 
change 
from 2007 
to 2010 
TOTAL -7 14 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing 
(A) 1 20 
Mining and quarrying (B) -1 22 
Manufacturing (C) -2 19 
Electricity, gas, steam and air 
conditioning supply (D) 1 5 
Construction (F) -5 14 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 
of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
(G) -6 17 
Accommodation and food service 
activities (I) -3 22 
Information and communication (J) -2 25 
Financial and insurance activities 
(K) -7 11 
Real estate activities (L) -3 16 
Professional, scientific and 
technical activities (M) 3 25 
Public administration and defence; 
compulsory social security (O) -26 -14 
Education (P) -22 -2 
Human health and social work 
activities (Q) -16 1 
Source: Central Statistical Office of Latvia 
 
 
2.2 Bank rescue and bank losses 
The second main difference between the countries is their capacity to save banks and the consequent 
distribution of bank losses.  
 
In Iceland, where credit to the private sector reached 3.5 times Icelandic GDP (Table 1), the 
combined balance sheet of banks reached an even greater number, and banks heavily borrowed from 
the wholesale market6, the government did not have the means to save the banks (Buiter and Sibert, 
2008; Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega, 2011). Therefore, there was no choice but to let the 
banks default when global money markets froze after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 
                                                 
6  For example, according the aggregate balance sheet of the credit system published by the Central Bank of 
Iceland, gross foreign borrowing exceeded lending to the domestic non-financial sectors in 2006 and 2007.  
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2008. Banks also suffered heavily from their domestic lending. In addition to the recession and the 
collapse in housing prices, the depreciating currency and the consequent accelerating inflation also 
led to deteriorating bank balance sheets. In mid-2008 more than 70 percent of total corporate loans 
were denominated in foreign currencies and most lending to households was indexed to the 
consumer price index. Borrowers, therefore, found it more difficult to service their debts. In addition, 
the Icelandic Supreme Court declared illegal foreign-exchange-indexed loans (ie loans paid out and 
collected in Icelandic krónur, but indexed to foreign currencies), thereby increasing the burden on 
banks7. 
 
Domestic deposits in Iceland (by both residents and non-residents) were fully guaranteed, but the 
issue of the depositors of Icesave, which operated as a branch of Landsbanki (one of the three 
formermajor Icelandic banks) in the UK and the Netherlands, is still unsettled. Foreign creditors of 
Icelandic banks faced a €47 billion loss (source: Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega, 2011, citing 
the Financial Services Authority of Iceland report). This loss is 3.1 times greater than 2007 Icelandic 
GDP and 5.4 times 2009 Icelandic GDP. The Central Bank of Iceland also suffered losses, since it 
provided massive liquidity support to banks, which, by mid-2008, reached about one-third of GDP 
(source: liquidity support is from Figure 3 of Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega, 2011; GDP is 
from Eurostat). Consequently, the Central Bank of Iceland needed significant recapitalisation from 
the government. Bank-related losses increased the public debt ratio by about 20 percentage points of 
GDP8. Parallel to the collapse of banks, the banking system was restructured to manage domestic 
credit and to keep the payments system functioning (Box 1).  
 
Box 1. Bank restructuring in Iceland 
In a matter of few weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, wholesale 
funding disappeared and the three major Icelandic banks, Glitnir, Kaupthing and Landsbanki, could 
not continue their operations. They were put into receivership and their boards replaced by resolution 
committees. Each of the failed banks was divided into two: a new and an old bank. New state-owned 
banks were established, and these banks took over the domestic activities of the three old banks, 
while international businesses remained with the failed old banks for winding up. The division itself 
was a complicated affair, involving protracted negotiations over the ‘fair value’ of the defaulted 
banks' assets as they were transferred to the new, post-crisis banks. In the end, creditors of the old 
banks placed capital in the new banks, thus ensuring their stake in any potential upside from an 
economic recovery. All three new banks have been recapitalised with strong capital ratios – in excess 
of 16 percent of all assets – and are 90 percent funded with deposits. Most of smaller savings banks 
were also restructured. During the whole process, all deposits in Iceland (both of residents and non-
residents) were guaranteed in full. 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland. 
END BOX 
 
                                                 
7  The first ruling of the Supreme Court in June 2010 applied to motor vehicle loans to households, which were 
later extended by the Icelandic Parliament to mortgage loans for residents (December 2010), and by the Supreme Court 
to corporate loans (June 2011). These loans were converted into domestic currency loans, whereby the outstanding 
principles of the loans were reduced considerably, and the interest rates were also recalculated (retroactively as well) 
using the lowest non-indexed interest rate published by the Central Bank of Iceland. 
8  According to the table on page 13 of IMF (2011b), bank restructuring debt amounts to 16.2 percentage point 
out of the 92.6 percent of GDP public debt of Iceland in 2010. According to Benediktsdottir, Danielsson and Zoega 
(2011) 12 percent of GDP was used to recapitalize banks and 11 percent of GDP to recapitalise the central bank. These 
numbers do not include the contingent impact of compensating the British and Dutch depositors of Icesave, but 
Danielsson and Zoega (2011) argue that the actual cost may not be more than 2% of GDP, since most of the costs will be 
covered by the recovery from the assets of Lansdbanki, the bank that operated Icesave. 
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In Ireland, the balance sheet of Irish-owned banks was 3.7 times GDP in 2007, yet with international 
financial centres the ratio was 7.1 times GDP (Table 1). The Irish government guaranteed most 
liabilities of Irish-owned banks. In September 2008, the total liabilities of the credit institutions 
resident in Ireland were €1,446 billion, of which €787 billion was the liability of domestic banks 
(source: Central Bank of Ireland). According to Davy Research (2009), the liability of Irish-owned 
banks was €575 billion, of which the guarantee covered € 440 billion. Taxpayers’ money was used to 
cover bank losses above bank capital (which was wiped out) and subordinated bank bondholders 
(whose loss is estimated to be about 10 percent of Irish GDP in the form of retiring €25 billion 
subordinated debt for new debt or equity of €10 billion). According to FitzGerald and Kearney 
(2011), of the €148 billion of gross public debt at end-2010, €46.3 billion (30 percent of GDP) was 
due to government intervention in the banking system, which increased to €60 billion (about 40 
percent of GDP) by mid-20119. The initial decision for not restructuring banks' senior debt was made 
entirely by the Irish authorities. But later, when the problems with the blanket guarantee became 
clearer and the issue emerged in political debates, the pressure from European institutions, most 
prominently the European Central Bank, but also from governments including countries outside the 
euro area (UK, US), prohibited a changed in the policy. The European Central Bank feared 
disruption of bank-funding markets throughout the euro area10.  
 
At the same time, the Eurosystem (lending from the European Central Bank and from the Central 
Bank of Ireland via the Exceptional Liquidity Assistance11), provided ample liquidity. This support is 
given at a very low interest rate of about one percent per year – well below the previous funding cost 
of banks, thereby amounting to significant support for Irish banks. The amount of Eurosystem 
lending has fluctuated between €78 billion and €138 billion since October 2008, the June 2011 figure 
amounting to €100 billion. Therefore, this massive low-interest rate lending was (and still is) a 
significant support to Irish banks. 
 
In Latvia about two thirds of the banking system was owned by foreign banks (mostly Scandinavian 
banks), which assumed banking losses and supported their Latvian subsidiaries, thereby making the 
lender-of-last-resort role of the Latvian central bank less relevant. The Swedish central bank offered 
a euro/lats swap to Latvia and the ECB agreed with the Swedish central bank a Swedish krona/euro 
swap. Thereby ECB support could have been channelled indirectly to Latvia. The major 
domestically-owned Parex Bank was nationalised. According to the ECB’s data on consolidated 
banking statistics, the loss incurred by foreign banks was about 5.7 percent of GDP and the loss of 
domestic banks about 3.6 percent of GDP by 2010 – a large amount, but well below the banking 
sector losses in the two other case-study countries. IMF (2011c, Table 4, page 35) calculated that 
bank support boosted the public debt/GDP ratio by about 7 percentage points of GDP by 2010. 
 
2.3 Capital controls 
The third major difference was the introduction of capital controls in Iceland but not in the other two 
countries. Due to fear of further capital outflows and additional depreciation of the Icelandic krona, 
in late 2008 strict capital controls were introduced in Iceland. This has locked in non-resident 
deposits and government paper holdings in Iceland and locked out Icelandic krona assets held 
outside the country, in addition to prohibiting transfers across the border by both residents and non-
residents. IMF (2011b, page 14) estimates offshore krona holdings at 30 percent of GDP and reports 
                                                 
9  These numbers do not include the operations of the National Asset management Agency (NAMA).  
10  O’Rourke (2011) and Brennan (2010) argue that the IMF advocated that the Irish government not pay back all 
of unguaranteed senior debt owned by Irish banks, but the EU and the ECB insisted upon the opposite. See Lane (2011a) 
for arguments against and in favour of restructuring of senior bank debt.  
11  See Buiter, Michels and Rahbari (2011). 
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a high spread between onshore and offshore exchange rates, indicating that the capital controls are 
effective (Figure 6 of IMF 2011b, page 15). 
 
Viterbo (2011) assessed the legality of Iceland’s capital controls in light of international agreements. 
While under the IMF Articles, countries retain the right to impose capital controls, the EEA 
(European Economic Area) Agreement guarantees the free movement of payments and capital 
among the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) states and European Union countries. The 
Icelandic controls were not deemed illegal under EEA regulations, because they were triggered by 
exceptional economic circumstances. But to remain legal, the restrictions would have to be lifted 
once the crisis was over, but this seems to be a major challenge (Gylfason, 2011; IMF, 2011b). 
 
2.4 Fiscal consolidation 
Fiscal consolidation, ie policy induced changes in government revenues and expenditures, was 
central to the adjustment programme of all three countries. As table 6 shows, Latvia’s adjustment 
was the most radical in 2009, while Ireland’s adjustment was the least ambitious in 2010. However, 
cumulatively the adjustment is broadly similar in the three countries.  
 
Table 6: Annual fiscal adjustment (% GDP) 
2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  
Iceland 5.1 6.4 2.5 na na na 
     Expenditure Reductions  3.2 3.6 1.7 na na na 
     Revenue Enhancement 1.9 2.8 0.8 na na na 
Ireland 5.0 2.6 3.7 2.2 1.8 1.6 
     Expenditure Reductions  na na 2.8 1.3 1.2 1.0 
     Revenue Enhancement na na 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 
Latvia 9.4 3.3 2.2 0.9 na na 
     Expenditure Reductions  8.2 1.9 0.6 0.4 na na 
     Revenue Enhancement 1.3 1.4 1.6 0.5 na na 
Sources: Ireland – Table 2 on page 135 of OECD (2011a), Iceland – Table 2.3 on page 73 of OECD (2011b), Latvia - 
IMF Latvia Team Calculations. 
 
 
3. Different economic outcomes 
 
Economic outcomes in the three countries were shaped by their pre-crisis vulnerabilities. All three 
went through massive credit booms (the speediest in Iceland) and an increasing share of construction 
in output (reaching the highest level in Iceland). Both Latvia and Iceland had unusually large current 
account deficits – over 20 percent of GDP (Figure 2). Ireland’s deficit was more moderate – about 5 
percent of GDP. As a consequence, the net international investment positions of Iceland and Latvia 
deteriorated significantly before the crisis, while in Ireland the deterioration was modest (Table 2). 
Since private capital inflows stopped abruptly in Iceland and Latvia after September 2008, the 
current account balance had to improve accordingly. The required improvements in external 
accounts had knock-on effects on all components of demand, employment and public finance.  
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Figure 2: Current account (% GDP), 1990-2012 
-25
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
20
10
Iceland
Ireland
Latvia
 
Source: European Commission (2011b). 
Note: the shaded 2011-2012 values are forecasts. 
 
Figure 3: Quarterly GDP and its main components (2007Q4=100, constant prices, seasonally 
adjusted), 2005Q1-2011Q3 
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Source: Author’s calculation using the data from Eurostat. 
Note: For each variable two lines are shown: the seasonally adjusted data is indicated with a thin line with symbols, and 
the Hodrick-Prescott filtered values are shown with the same colour thick line without symbols. For Hodrick-Prescott 
filtering we used the smoothing parameter 1, a very low parameter, to filter out high frequency noise only. Note that the 
standard smoothing parameter for quarterly data is 1600. The comparison of the original and this Hodrick-Prescott 
filtered series suggests that the filter well captures the main tendencies and also the turning points. 
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• In all three countries economic hardship started several quarters before the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers in September 2008; therefore, we normalise quarterly GDP figures as 2007 
Q4 = 100 in Figure 3. From peak to trough, Latvian GDP collapsed by 25 percent, which is 
about twice as much as in Iceland and Ireland, even though in all three countries output fell 
back to its early 2005 level. Among the 184 countries included in IMF (2011d), Latvia 
suffered from the greatest fall in output in 2009 (18 percent), and also during the three years 
from 2007 to 2010 (22 percent). Ireland (fifth place) and Iceland (seventh place) are also 
among the worst performers in the ranking of cumulative output loss from 2007 to 2010, with 
drops in output of ten and nine percent, respectively. 
• In Iceland the massive current account adjustment was to a great extent fostered by export 
growth. Among the 34 countries for which Eurostat publishes constant price data on exports 
of goods and services, Iceland was the only country where there was a growth in 2009 
compared to 2008 (Figure 4). It is not clear cut if the large exchange rate depreciation had a 
positive impact on exports in Iceland, because about one-half of exports are concentrated in 
aluminium and marine products, and the growth of aluminium exports was likely the result of 
the new capacities built in the years before the crisis (see Appendix). However, the exports of 
services (comprising 35 percent of total Icelandic exports of goods and services) picked-up in 
2009, a year after the real exchange rate depreciation. These exports may have been 
positively affected by the depreciation. Also, the higher costs of imports have likely 
encouraged import substitution. More generally, the highly increased revenues from export 
activities likely dampened the impact of the crisis. 
• Exports also started to recover in Ireland and Latvia in 2010, a trend forecast to continue by 
the European Commission (2011b). However, Ireland and Latvia are only in the mid-field 
compared to the performance of other countries (Panel A of Figure 4). But, export volumes 
also depend on foreign demand, which contracted by about 8 percent more for Latvia than for 
the other two countries12. To correct for different developments in import markets, Panel B of 
Figure 4 shows the ratio of export volumes of the country under consideration to import 
volumes of trading partners. The performances of Ireland and Latvia are almost identical in 
this regard and they are in the mid-field, while Iceland is still among the best performers, 
though its advantage is declining. 
• There was a similar collapse in investment in all three countries and so far investment has 
started to recover only in Latvia. 
• Private consumption went into free fall in both Iceland and Latvia. The adjustment in Ireland 
was smaller, but it is still on-going, while in Iceland and Latvia private consumption growth 
has resumed. 
• Public consumption adjusted the most in Latvia (a 20 percent drop); less so in Ireland and, in 
particular, in Iceland. This partly reflects the different speeds of fiscal consolidation in the 
three countries (Table 6). 
• Imports declined by about 40 percent in Iceland and Latvia, in line with the fall in investment 
and private consumption, while the Irish import decline (14 percent) was similar to the EU 
average. 
 
                                                 
12  This is largely due to the higher share of Estonia, Lithuania, Russia and Ukraine (four countries that witnessed 
massive import contraction) in Latvian exports. 
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Figure 4: Exports of goods and services in 34 countries (at constant prices, 2007=100), 2007-
2012 
A. Export volume                                                  B. Export volume divided by foreign import volume 
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Source: Author’s calculation using data from European Commission (2011b), OECD, and national sources (for China, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, Ukraine). 
Note: The shaded 2011-2012 values are forecasts. Panel A shows the development of exports of goods and services in 34 
countries for which the Eurostat publishes these data: the 27 EU countries plus Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Croatia, 
Turkey, United States and Japan. Panel B shows the ratio of export volume to foreign import volume. Foreign import 
volume is the weighted averages (using country-specific weights derived from 2007 export data) of imports of goods and 
services of 47 countries, the 34 countries listed so far plus Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong, Israel, Korea, 
Macedonia (Former Yugoslav Republic), Mexico, Russia, Singapore, Thailand and Ukraine. On average, these 47 
countries comprise 89 percent of exports, while for Iceland, Ireland and Latvia the coverage is 94-95 percent.  
 
 
These developments in output and demand translated into very different social impacts. 
• Iceland experienced a modest (5 percent) drop in employment from 2007 to 2010 Table 7), 
while job losses were much more dramatic in Latvia (17 percent) and Ireland (13 percent). 
The number of jobs in Latvia fell below the level of early 2000 – though there has been a 
slight recovery in employment since early 2010 (see the third panel in the third row of Figure 
1). 
• Poverty was already high in Latvia and has increased, while Iceland was not impacted in this 
regard, and in Ireland a gradual improvement up to 2009 reversed somewhat in 2010 (Figure 
5). 
 
Figure 5: At risk of poverty rate (% of population), 2005-2010 
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Source: Eurostat (all data but the 2010 data for Ireland, which was chained to Eurostat data using data from the Irish 
Central Statistics Office). 
Note: The rate assesses whether disposable net income (both from employment, investment and social transfers) falls 
below the poverty threshold. The threshold is set at 60 percent of the national median income per equivalent adult. 
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The different employment impacts are not the consequence of shortening work time – in all three 
countries the average hours worked per week declined by 4-5 percent (Table 4 and Figure 1). Also, 
the difference is not the consequence of emigration, since Iceland experienced the largest net 
emigration (as a percent of population) in 2008 and 2009 (Figure 6), even though official data on 
migration may not be reliable. But in any case, emigration cannot explain the employment impact 
when the level of unemployment has reached such a high level as in Ireland and Latvia. 
 
Figure 6: Net immigration (% of population), 2000-2010 
-2.0%
-1.5%
-1.0%
-0.5%
0.0%
0.5%
1.0%
1.5%
2.0%
20
00
20
02
20
04
20
06
20
08
20
10
Iceland
Ireland
Latvia
 
Source: population data is from Eurostat, migration data is from the central statistical offices of the three countries. Note 
that migration data could be unreliable.  
 
The differences in employment response could be related to policies, the sectoral composition of 
production, and the shift in sectoral composition.  
 
Table 7 shows that the major differences are 
• Industrial employment, which remained broadly stable in Iceland, but which fell by almost 20 
percent in the other two countries; 
• Public employment, which fell by 10 percent in Latvia, but has even slightly increased in the 
other two countries; 
• Construction employment, which fell by 33 percent in Iceland and about 50 percent in the 
other two countries – yet the share of construction employment in total employment was the 
smallest in Iceland in 2007 and was still the smallest in 2010; 
• Agriculture and fishing employment, which fell less in Iceland (though the share of this 
sector in total employment is small). 
Therefore, employment in industry, which is the most tradable sector, was protected in Iceland, but 
almost every fifth job was lost in Ireland and Latvia. 
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Table 7: Change in employment from 2007 to 2010  
Iceland Ireland Latvia
2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
Agriculture and fishing -8 -23 -21 5.9 5.8 5.5 4.9 9.7 9.2
Construction -33 -54 -50 9.0 6.3 13.4 7.1 11.3 6.7
Finance and real estate -3 -5 -3 14.9 15.2 13.6 14.9 9.8 11.5
Industry -1 -19 -18 11.7 12.2 14.0 13.0 16.5 16.3
Public Administration 2 5 -11 34.3 36.9 27.0 32.5 23.3 24.7
Trade, Tourism, Transport -8 -9 -10 24.3 23.5 26.5 27.6 29.3 31.6
Total -5 -13 -17 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
2007 to 2010 percent change Share in total employment (percent)
Iceland Ireland Latvia
 
Note: The peak of Icelandic construction employment was in 2008, which was followed by a 40 percent fall by 2010. 
Source: European Commission (2011b). 
 
Table 8: Shifts among the branches of economic activity from 2007 to 2010 
Iceland Ireland Latvia 2007 2010 2007 2010 2007 2010
A. Agriculture, forestry and fishing -4 2 9 5.3 6.6 1.4 1.0 3.5 4.5
         Fishing and aquaculture -6 4.2 5.5
         Other 9 1.0 1.1
B&C&D&E. Industry 18 13 -8 14.2 19.1 23.7 25.9 15.0 18.7
       C. Manufacturing 19 -12 9.9 13.8 21.6 23.8 11.7 13.4
                Manufacture of basic metals 123 1.7 2.8
                Other manufacturing 0 8.2 11.0
       B&D&E. Other industry 14 8 4.3 5.3 2.1 2.1 3.3 5.3
F. Construction -59 -58 -50 11.4 4.1 9.6 5.5 10.4 5.9
G&H&I&J. Trade; repair; Transport; Tourism; Information -7 -12 -18 21.9 20.7 33.0 34.3
K. Financial and insurance activities -40 -16 6.6 7.8 5.4 3.7
L. Real estate activities -13 2 11.0 11.0 8.2 8.3
M&N&R&S. Other services -14 -26 9.2 9.9 9.3 9.8
O-Q. Public administration; social security; education; 
health
-1 -4 -15
20.3 20.7 15.2 14.8
All sectors (gross value added) -11 -8 -17 100 100 100 100 100 100
All sectors (GDP) -9 -10 -21
Iceland Ireland Latvia
Share in output (percent)Gross value added
 (percent change in real 
output from 2007 to 2010)
-12
 
Source: central statistical office of the three countries. 
Note: empty cells indicate non-available data. For Ireland, data for the branches K and L are not available separately, but 
only their aggregate. The peak of Irish construction output as a share of total output was 10.6 percent in 2006. 
 
 
Looking at the shifts in economic activity (Table 8), the share of industry in total output has 
increased in all three countries, but while in Iceland and Ireland real industrial output has also 
increased, in Latvia real industrial output fell, though by a lesser magnitude (by 8 percent) than total 
output (17 percent).  
 
Comparison of Tables 7 and 8 allows productivity developments to be inferred. Of particular 
importance, industrial productivity has increased in all three countries – most rapidly in Ireland by 39 
percent, followed by Iceland (19 percent) and Latvia (12 percent). 
 
The differences between Iceland and Latvia in terms of output and employment are likely explained 
by real exchange rate developments, since both countries had to adjust massively their net external 
financing. The prompt and significant nominal and real exchange rate adjustment increased the 
revenue of exporting companies (even if the debt servicing burden went up for those with foreign 
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currency loans), while in Latvia the ULC-based real exchange rate depreciation was delayed, gradual 
and smaller in magnitude. It also seems reasonable to assume that the Irish output fall was less 
dramatic than in Latvia because of the smaller external adjustment need.  
 
However, what is less clear is why Irish employment contracted much more than in Iceland given the 
broadly similar GDP developments and the fall in the share of construction in GDP. Construction 
employment fell more in Ireland than in Iceland, but this is just one and not the most important part 
of the difference, since Irish industrial employment was also dropped massively. Perhaps the major 
real exchange rate adjustment helped the Icelandic economy to shift from the non-tradable to the 
tradable sector faster, improving growth prospects, and this mitigated the employment impact, 
despite the broadly similar output development to date.  
 
But it is also possible that corporate restructuring was delayed in Iceland. Several companies became 
insolvent due to sharp currency depreciation, because – as we have said earlier – most corporate 
loans were indexed to foreign currencies. But most of these companies were not closed down but 
passed into bank ownership – banks have become holding companies of a sort. Banks may have 
delayed the proper restructuring of these companies so far. Unfortunately we have no information 
about the speed of corporate restructuring in Ireland, but if this has been much slower in Iceland, it 
could explain some of the differences in employment developments. 
 
What about public finances?  
• Before the crisis, gross government debt was below 30 percent of GDP in all three countries, 
but started to balloon quickly (Figure 7). In addition to the fall in output and the large budget 
deficits, support to the banking sector has also contributed to the increase in public debt13. As 
said in section 2.2, bank support boosted Irish public debt by about 40 percent of GDP, 
Icelandic public debt by about 20 percent and Latvian public debt by about 7 percent. Since 
Iceland and Latvia gained better control over the budget deficit than Ireland – partly due to 
the difference in bank support – European Commission (2011b) forecasts stabilisation of the 
debt ratio in the two countries, but in Ireland a further 20 percentage points of GDP increase 
is expected till 2012 (Figure 7). 
• The credit default swap (CDS) spread on the sovereign rose above 1000 basis points in Latvia 
and Iceland in late 2008 and early 2009, while staying at a level of about 250 basis points in 
Ireland (Figure 8). This situation has reversed since then, but Irish CDS spreads have also 
declined substantially since summer 2011 – despite the on-going euro-area sovereign debt 
and banking crisis. 
• On 9 June 2011, for the first time since the crisis, the Icelandic and Latvian governments 
successfully issued bonds on the international bond markets (see details in Reuters, 2011). 
This is especially remarkable for Iceland, a country that still maintains strict capital controls 
and let its banks default on their foreign liabilities. Also, both Iceland and Latvia could 
borrow in domestic currency from the start of the official assistance programme in late 2008 
(IMF 2011b and 2011c). In contrast, the Irish government has stopped borrowing from 
markets since the start of its assistance programme in late November 2010 (IMF 2011a), 
though small-scale retail and commercial paper selling has continued. 
 
                                                 
13  Bank support is part of the reported budget deficit, yet it is important to highlight its impact separately. 
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Figure 7: General government gross debt (% GDP), 1990-2012 
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Source: European Commission (2011b). 
Note: the shaded 2011-2012 values are forecasts. 
 
Figure 8: 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread on sovereigns, 2 January 2008 – 24 
November, in basis points 
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Source: Datastream. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Iceland, Ireland and Latvia experienced similar developments before the crisis, in particular rapid 
increases in banks’ balance sheets and the expansion of the construction sector. But the the crisis hit 
the countries differently: 
• Latvia was the world's hardest-hit country in terms of GDP decline. Employment also 
suffered massively (-17 percent) – more than in any other country for which Eurostat 
publishes data; the current level of employment is just slightly above the level in 2000. The 
already high level of poverty has increased further. 
• Ireland was the world's fifth hardest hit country in terms of GDP decline from 2007 to 2010 
(10 percent) and employment has also fallen significantly (-13 percent).  
• Iceland, the world's seventh hardest hit country in terms of GDP decline (-9 percent), came 
out from the crisis with the smallest drop in employment (-5 percent) among the three 
countries, despite the greatest shock to its financial system.  
 
In exiting the crisis, there are several encouraging signals for all three countries: 
• First, recovery has started in all three countries – with the fastest pace in Latvia – though it 
has not yet brought many new jobs. 
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• Exports are growing in all three countries, with again the fastest pace in Latvia, where 
exports suffered the most during the first phase of the crisis. 
• The total-economy ULC-based real effective exchange rate has depreciated significantly in 
all three countries. 
• The various fiscal, structural and banking sector targets of the official financing programmes 
are on track in all three countries. 
• It was a great success that both Iceland and Latvia could tap the international bond market in 
June 2011 and five-year CDS spreads on government bonds have declined to about 200-300 
basis points in both countries.  
• It is also a success that Irish CDS spreads have declined from the peak of over 1000 basis 
point in June 2011 to about 600-700 basis points in November 2011, despite the intensifying 
euro-area sovereign debt and banking crisis during the same period. Also, sizeable injection 
of private capital into the Bank of Ireland signals increasing confidence in the country 
(European Commission, 2011a). 
 
Even though there were common elements in the policy mix, such as fiscal austerity, structural 
reforms, private-debt restructuring and banking-system support, the diverse crisis responses are 
partly the consequence of differences in policy responses. The main country-specific elements were: 
• In Iceland there was no choice but to let banks default and the currency depreciate. In 
addition, strict capital controls were introduced to limit capital outflows and dampen the 
collapse of the exchange rate. Delay in corporate restructuring may have also damped the 
employment impact.  
• In Ireland banks were not allowed to default, but the government assumed most of the bank 
losses – beyond wiping out bank capital and the involvement of subordinated bank 
bondholders, which suffered losses of about 10 percent of GDP. 
• In Latvia the exchange rate peg to the euro was kept. Since about 60 percent of bank assets 
belonged to subsidiaries of foreign banks, a significant share of bank losses was assumed by 
the parent banks. Fiscal austerity was the most radical in Latvia. 
 
Isolating the impact of each element of the policy mix on the response to the crisis and the speed of 
recovery is not possible. Yet several lessons can be drawn: 
• The Icelandic example in the aftermath of the collapse of the exchange rate shows that the 
fears among Latvian policymakers of a similar collapse were not well justified. Iceland had 
much higher gross and also net foreign liabilities than Latvia and the shock in Iceland was 
really enormous – much higher than what Latvia would have suffered with exchange-rate 
devaluation. The banking sector suffered meltdown in Iceland and foreign lenders to banks 
suffered massive losses. Yet the crisis impact was much more benign in Iceland than 
Latvia14.Internal devaluation, a path that Ireland had to choose and Latvia decided to choose, 
has not really worked through wage reductions. Public sector wages were cut drastically in 
Latvia (26 percent fall), which is less relevant for competitiveness, but private sector wages 
have hardly fallen. In Ireland nominal wages fell somewhat, but their contribution to the drop 
in unit labour costs was also very small. At the same time unemployment skyrocketed in both 
                                                 
14  See Darvas (2009) for an assessment of various arguments in favour and against devaluation, in which paper I 
suggested a speedy euro entry (enhanced by changes in the EU Treaty or at least by a proper interpretation of current 
Treaty provisions for euro-area entry) at a devalued exchange rate, supported by appropriate resolution to manage the 
debt overhang. Unfortunately, there were no policy intentions to change or at least to properly interpret the EU Treaty. 
Yet the Icelandic experience suggests that Latvia would have likely been better off with devaluation even without the 
option of a speedy entry into the euro area. Therefore, in this important respect I disagree with the conclusion of Åslund 
and Dombrovskis (2011), even though I agree that other elements of the adjustment programme was well designed and 
its implementation was a heroic achievement. 
 20 
countries, which was not just related to layoffs of public sector and construction workers. It 
would have been much better to adjust through lower wages than through lay-offs.  
• Productivity improvements, which were impressive in Ireland (12 percent increase during the 
past three years) and moderate in Latvia (6 percent increase), accompanied the strategy of 
internal devaluation. However, in both countries productivity improved because of a 
significant drop in output and an even more significant drop in employment. While any 
productivity improvement helps the survival of the corporate sector, the social impact of 
unemployment is very alarming. 
• Total economy productivity increased marginally (by 3 percent) in Iceland, but the tradable 
sector has strengthened and industrial productivity improved very fast – faster than in Latvia 
but less rapidly than in Ireland. 
• The negative impacts of capital controls in the cases of Iceland are not really visible. While 
Arnason and Danielson (2011) rightly argue that capital controls have negative consequences, 
such as transfer of new powers to the government enabling it to implement industrial policy 
(by deciding who can change Icelandic krona to foreign currencies), signalling wrong prices 
(since the on-shore exchange rate is not a market rate), and significantly limiting currency 
exchange for ordinary citizens, Iceland is doing well and the fall in its CDS spread and the 
success of its international bond issues suggests that trust has returned. Yet, a major challenge 
lies ahead to lift capital controls (Gylfason, 2011; IMF, 2011b). 
• The experience with the collapse of the gigantic Icelandic banking system suggests that 
letting banks fail when they had a faulty business model can be the right choice. While 
socialising bank losses in Ireland was initially an Irish decision, later, when the Irish 
government wanted to change course, European institutions barred it primarily in the name of 
financial stability in the euro area and beyond. At the same time, politicians in countries 
where banks are heavily exposed to Ireland were afraid of bank losses and their implications 
for their own countries – and thereby argued against involving the creditors of Irish banks. 
Little is known about what would have happened to financial stability outside Ireland in the 
event of letting Irish banks default, but one thing is clear: other countries have benefited from 
the Irish socialisation of a large share of bank losses, which has significantly contributed to 
the explosion of Irish public debt. The very high level of interconnectedness of European 
banks and potential cross-country spillovers of national bank resolution practices strongly 
call for an EU-wide bank resolution regime (Posen and Véron, 2009; and Véron, 2011). Yet 
EU-wide resolution could work if regulation and supervision are also centralised, and an EU-
wide deposit guarantee would also make the financial system more resilient. There is a strong 
case for a ‘banking federation’. 
• The fulfilment of programme targets in terms of fiscal adjustment and structural reforms 
suggests that, whenever the programme is well designed and there is political will, public 
support and sufficiently effective institutions, very large adjustments are possible. If the 
adjustment experiences of the three countries could be a lesson for other countries, such as 
the Mediterranean countries of the euro area, should be the subject of a different study. 
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Appendix: Composition of Iceland’s export 
Iceland’s export is highly concentrated in two major industries: aluminium and marine/other fish 
products. In 2010 export goods belonging to these two major product categories comprised 52 
percent of Iceland’s total exports of goods and services (Panel A of Figure 9). The share of services 
was 35 percent (of which about one-half is related to transportation and one-quarter to tourism), the 
share of non-aluminium manufacturing goods was 10 percent and the share of all other goods was 3 
percent.  
 
Unfortunately, volume index is not available for product categories, but only for the aggregate of 
goods and services. Figure 10 shows that export volumes increased rapidly around the time of the 
significant depreciation (which started in late 2007 and accelerated in early 2008). While the speedy 
increase in the volume of services that started in 2009 is likely related to the depreciation, such an 
impact is not clear-cut for the export of goods. Unfortunately, the volume index is not available for 
export good categories only, but their weight is available (Panel B of Figure 9). Weight is a rather 
imprecise measure of volume when the composition is changing.15 But keeping in mind this 
imprecision, Panel B of Figure 9 suggests that there was a strong expansion of aluminium exports in 
2007 and especially in 2008. Most likely the main reason behind this was not the free-fall of the 
exchange rate, but the new capacities that were built in the years before. However, the weight of 
other goods exported was broadly stable at a time when global trade declined significantly, a 
development in which the exchange rate may have had a role. And the revenue from all export 
activities has increased significantly after the fall of the exchange rate, thereby helping the survival 
of the sectors producing for exports. 
 
                                                 
15  This is apparent from the comparison of the current price and weight developments of the exports of other 
goods after 2007. A seeming anomaly is the fall of current price exports (Panel A of figure 8) when the weight is broadly 
stable (Panel B). Export of aircrafts (along with some other product categories) is responsible for this seeming anomaly. 
In 2009 aircrafts accounted for 55 percent of the value of exports of other goods, but only 0.5 percent of their weight. By 
2010, the weight of exported aircrafts declined by 25 percent (causing negligible impact on the total weight of exported 
other goods), but it has reduced by 38 percent the Iceland krona value of exports. 
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Figure 9: Composition of Icelandic exports, 2000-2010 
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Source: Statistics Iceland. 
 
Figure 10: Volume of Icelandic exports and imports (2007=100), 2000-2010 
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